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Abstract
Purpose – Drawing on the bribery literature, this paper aims to examine the effect of bribes paid in
the home country on firms’ decision to internationalize through exports from transition economies. It
also investigates whether the effect of home country bribery may vary from new ventures to
established firms, and from those firms that operate in an environment with high to low informal
competition.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper tests several hypotheses using a panel data with fixed
effects based on a sample of firms in transition economies from the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey.
Findings – First, home country bribery in transition economies can make domestic markets more lenient
and dampen firms’ motivation to seek opportunities abroad. Second, new ventures have a higher motivation
to focus on their domestic markets after paying bribes. Finally, despite the benefits accrued in the home
country through bribery, firms that face a higher level of informal competition in the home country are more
likely to seek opportunities abroad.
Practical implications – Managers in transition economies should consider their home country bribery
activities in their evaluation of foreign market opportunities. Firms that use money to influence home country
government officials, especially new ventures, are advised to have a more holistic view in evaluating foreign
market opportunities so they will not miss out on new opportunities.
Originality/value – This paper advances literature on home country institutions and the research on firm
global strategies. Moreover, it also highlights several contingencies that shape the effect of home country
bribery on firms’ foreignmarket focus.
Keywords Transition economies, New venture, Foreign market focus, Home country bribery,
Informal competition
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Although illegal and unpalatable, business-related bribes exist in almost every society
(Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999; Getz and Volkema, 2001). In transition economies especially,
the estimated amount of bribes paid is US$20bn to US$40bn annually (Transparency
International, 2009). Bribery is relatively salient in these countries (Filatotchev et al., 2008;
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resources, information and law enforcement (Lee et al., 2010). High levels of discretion and
power attached to government officials allow them to solicit illegal payments from firms
(Doh et al., 2003; Rodriguez et al., 2005) in exchange for needed resources and public services.
While scholars have provided much insights for bribery (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Park,
2003; Yim et al., 2017), most studies focus on the determinants of bribery rather than its
strategic implications. In particular, the literature has been relatively silent regarding how
bribery may affect firms’ foreign market strategies. To fill this gap, this study examines
how bribery in the home country may influence firms’ motivation to seek opportunities
abroad. Specifically, we ask the following questions:
 How does bribery in the home country influence firms’ interests in foreign markets?
 Under which conditions is this effect strengthened or weakened?
Drawing upon the literature on corruption and bribery (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Rose-
Ackerman, 1997), we develop arguments examining how home country bribery affects
firms’ foreign market focus and the contingencies that shape this proposed effect. By doing
so, our study makes three contributions to literature. First, prior research has maintained
that when market mechanisms are not well-developed, the institutional void would be
substantial (Khanna and Plaepu, 1997, 2000). Our study adds to this literature by
articulating how firms may cope with these institutional voids through bribery, in return for
the needed resources or favors in the domestic market (Oliver, 1991; Witt and Lewin, 2007).
Second, we contend that bribery in the home country has crucial implications for firms – it
enhances firms’ interest in the domestic market while reducing the motivation to seek
foreign markets. Third, our study examines whether this effect is moderated by key
contingencies pertinent to transitional economies.
Whether firms are new ventures is a critical contingency in our study. We assert that
new ventures are more vulnerable in hostile home countries, which could be described
as a “sparse” entrepreneurial environment (Dubini, 1988) as adequate mechanisms that
support new ventures are not fully established (Lyles et al., 1995). New ventures may
also lack the experience, resources and support to move beyond their home market,
thus having less motivation to enter foreign markets. As new ventures bribe home
country officials, the advantages resulting from bribery may enhance their positions in
the domestic market while reducing their interest in exploring foreign markets.
In addition, we propose that competitive pressure from the informal sector would shape
the impact of home country bribery on firms’ interest in seeking foreign markets. The
underdevelopment of institutions may also breed an informal economy, where business
entities without the legal identities can operate and compete against legal ones (Castells and
Portes, 1989; Schneider and Enste, 2000). These informal entities create obstacles for formal
firms’ home country operations (Bruton et al., 2012; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). In this
study, we argue that the presence of informal firms in a country may erode the benefits from
bribery and thus alter its effect on firmmarket focus.
Furthermore, the fact whether firms are new ventures or not and the informal
competition can operate simultaneously in changing the effect of home country bribery.
While new ventures that bribe home country officials have some motivation to focus on the
domestic market, they are likely to seek opportunities abroad when there are strong
competitive forces of the informal firms.We test these arguments using a panel data of firms
located in 26 transition economies. We develop a unique database using the multi-country
and multi-year surveys initiated by the European Bank for Reconstruction and






Bribery and firm internationalization
There have been a few studies on the effect of corruption on firms’ decision for
internationalization, but relatively little is known about the topic (Lee and Weng, 2013;
Olney, 2016). While studies in the International Business (IB) literature have examined how
institutional misalignments between the needs of firms and the environment lead to firms’
escape to foreign countries (Witt and Lewin, 2007; Yamakawa et al., 2008), earlier studies
have not examined the effect of bribery payments that are made by individual firms to
government officials. While corruption level is one component of institutional quality, firms’
decisions to bribe may depend on other factors besides just the institutional constraints that
are faced.
Other studies have examined the relationship between corruption specifically and
international trade (Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007), but fail to account for individual firms’
export decisions as response to perceived corruption. While Olney (2016) complements this
literature by providing an individual firm analysis with the Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) data, he proxies corruption as the degree to which
firms perceive corruption to be an obstacle to their operations and finds that corruption in
developing countries may adversely affect access to foreign markets (Olney, 2016). Our
paper differentiates itself by focusing specifically on individual firms’ bribes paid to
government officials and how that decision affects firms’ market orientation, namely, their
tendency to venture out in foreign markets through exports.
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, bribery is “money or favor given or
promised to influence the judgment or conduct of a person in a position of trust,” while
corruption is “dishonest or illegal behavior especially by powerful people (such as
government officials).” They are both used to describe illicit transactions between the giver
and the receiver of payment in exchange for favors but are different in the sense that bribery
is used from the giver (firm)’s perspective, while corruption is from the receiver (government
officials). In the literature, studies such as Lambsdorff (2007) and Sandholtz and Koetzle
(2000) define corruption offenses as inclusive of bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion,
nepotism and kickbacks. From these definitions, we could infer that applied to our context,
bribery is firms’ act of using payments for favors, while corruption means the overall,
comprehensive tendency of government officials in a country to engage in and allow illicit
behavior for their private gain.
The literature further suggests that firm bribery is quite common in transition economies
(Doh et al., 2003; Rodriguez et al., 2005). Governments are an important source of influence
on business policies and resource control, and the institutional voids in these countries
(Khanna and Plaepu, 1997, 2000) provide ample opportunities for mismanagement and
corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Many transition countries are also marked by the
legacies of communism, in the form of political influence, bribery and corruption (Devinney,
2013).
Bribery transactions constitute both demand and supply (Martin et al., 2007; Rose-
Ackerman, 1997, p. 34). On the demand side, officials’ discretionary power allows them to
(mis)use this authority toward increasing personal welfare (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).
Government officials may accordingly request bribes and kickbacks from private agents to
compensate for inadequate salaries (Holmes, 1999). On the supply side, there is no shortage
of evidence showing that bribes are used by firms to “seek to influence the agent’s exercise
of discretion” (Banfield, 1975, p. 596). Bribes can be offered by firms to ameliorate the




report that more than half of surveyed managers admitted to engaging in bribes proactively
rather than passively in less developed countries such as Nigeria (Ufere et al., 2012, p. 2444).
While an institutional environment where extortionate bribery demands are common
may be characterized as a hostile home country which some firms may respond to through
escapism (Witt and Lewin, 2007), some firms may display other strategic responses such as
acquiescence or abatement (Oliver, 1991; Witt and Lewin, 2007). We view bribery payments
made by firms as an example of firms accepting the institutional misalignment and its cost,
as well as attempting to reduce this cost (in the case of bribery to change laws – grand
corruption [Rose-Ackerman, 2002]). Even though bribery makes firms’ operations costlier,
and thus erode the potential profit that could be realized, the truth is that in an environment
where every firm faces bribery demands or ample opportunity to voluntarily offer bribes in
return for the anticipated benefits, those firms that choose to accept this condition and pay
their dues earn benefits which put themmomentarily ahead of their competitors who did not
bribe.
The strategic implications of bribery
In countries where government officials hold discretionary power over the allocation of
valuable resources, control of information, rulemaking and enforcement amid a lack of
sound institutions, firms offer them bribery in “illegal informal exchanges” for certain
preferential treatments (Mudambi et al., 2013). First, bribery greases the wheel of commerce
(Banfield, 1975; Getz and Volkema, 2001; Luo, 2005; Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Hsieh and
Moretti (2006), for instance, document government officials misusing their power to sell
public resources or products (e.g. oil) at prices below market values. Under this system of
dual prices consisting of “a low state price and a higher free market price” (Rose-Ackerman,
1997, p. 35), firms can obtain resources at a lower cost by bribing.
Second, bribes can buy favorable interpretations of the law and lenient treatments. This
is particularly important in transition economies where rules and regulations change
frequently and rapidly. Iakovleva et al. (2013, p. 325) interview managers in Russia and
Ukraine and find that managers “have to be ready to overcome various bureaucratic
barriers” to develop a business. As governments impose regulations, levy taxes, enforce
criminal laws and impose these costs selectively on firms, the firms’ competitive positions
within the domestic market are shaken. In response, firms may resort to bribes, as
government officials have the discretion to “clarify regulatory requirements” and “lighten
the regulatory load” (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, p. 36).
For instance, in Russia, bribery fuels the extensive illegal timber trade: firms selling
illegally sourced logs can avoid some of the compliance costs and taxes, allowing them to
offer logs at significantly reduced prices after bribing corrupt local officials (Vandergert and
Newell, 2003). Bribery also allows firms to get away with other forms of corporate
malfeasance: vodka manufacturers and retailers in Russia have used money so that officials
would turn a blind eye toward tax evasion (Virkunen, 1999). As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978,
p. 195) insightfully argue, money has the power to buy “exclusive coverage and competitive
advantage.”
In addition, bribes can reduce the obstacles associated with home country operations and
speed up necessary bureaucratic processes. This suggests that additional payments could
help firms bypass the red tape (Luo and Han, 2009; Rose-Ackerman, 1997) and reduce the
adverse impact of red tape (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Doh et al., 2003; Lee and Weng, 2013).
Similarly, key resources such as access to credit are usually controlled by governments




helping firms acquire the needed financial capital for their operations (Khwaja and Mian,
2005).
Hypotheses
How home country bribery affects firm foreign market focus
One important strategic decision firms must make is whether to move beyond its domestic
market by exploring international markets. While firms may have different options for
tapping into foreign markets, making sales in foreign countries is a common method given
the relatively low commitment and risk involved (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Oviatt and
McDougall, 1994). As all firms have limited resources, an emphasis on foreign market sales
would ultimately “affect the allocation of resources [. . .] in the domestic market” (Campa and
Guillén, 1999, p. 1463). On the other hand, a greater emphasis in the domestic market would
mean that firms become more focused on their home countries and less on foreign markets.
We contend that firm bribery at home may influence its market focus and strategy to sell
in foreign markets. This argument is supported by several reasons. First, government
officials can “impose costs selectively in a way that affects the competitive position of firms
in an industry” (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, p. 36). Firms that bribe can avoid certain costs and
obtain additional benefits by seeking “unfair advantages and special treatments” relative to
firms that do not (Martin et al., 2007, p. 1403). Then the extent to which bribes can
strengthen firms’ domestic market positions and make the home country market more
attractive.
While the lack of control over the needed resources – such as information regarding
changing policies and favorable treatment – creates substantial uncertainty for entities
operating within that environment, bribery can be one method to mitigate this uncertainty
(Tan and Chintakananda, 2016). Bribery may allow firms to obtain inside information
regarding future policies and regulations before their competitors do, such that bribing
firms can “occupy a superior position in the market or grasp some early-mover
opportunities” (Luo, 2005, p. 131). Since the benefits resulting from firm bribery are mainly
applied within the home country (Claessens et al., 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005), firms that
use bribery to acquire resources in the home country may be less likely to abandon these
benefits. In contrast, firms that bribe less have relatively fewer benefits to give up should
they decide to tap into markets beyond their home bases.
Bribing firms may accordingly be motivated to focus on the reduced risks and enhanced
competitive positions within their domestic market (Ito and Pucik, 1993). In general, foreign
firms are inherently in a disadvantageous position relative to local competitors when
operating within foreign countries, as local knowledge is difficult to obtain (Eden andMiller,
2004; Zaheer, 1995). The more firms bribe in the home country, the more attractive the
domestic market will be. Thus, when bribing – acquiescing to the institutional weaknesses –
gives firms benefits, paying more bribes would provide firms certain advantages in the
home country. As such, these firms will be motivated to take advantage of the benefits
resulting from bribery rather than look for opportunities elsewhere.We therefore argue:
H1. Bribery in the home country will reduce firm focus on foreign markets.
We note that this hypothesis is a general prediction, and its effect may vary depending on
certain contextual factors. To better understand the effect of home country bribery, it is
useful to examine these critical contingencies. In the present study, we consider two factors
as such: the distinction between new ventures and established firms as well as the




Moderating role of new ventures
While both established and newer firms need government resources, new ventures are
inherently in a more disadvantageous position since they are more vulnerable and resource-
poorer than established firms. Prior research notes that young firms face certain difficulties
and greater risk of failure (Coleman, 2004; Hannan and Freeman, 1984), also discussed as the
“liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965). New ventures face greater resource constraints
and lack legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994), and they also “possess comparatively little
power and may be at the government’ mercy relative to firm performance” (Sproul et al.,
2014, p. 1). Thus, the resources that they could gain from the government from bribing
would be more crucial and valuable, compared to the same amount of government resources
earned by established firms.
Especially in transition economies that lack adequate and legitimate market mechanisms
that support new ventures (Dubini, 1988), ventures may resort to use bribes to create a more
favorable environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). For example, some entrepreneurs in
Russia reported that bribery expedites public utility service such as telephone installation,
and the opportunity to purchase equipment from state enterprises (Webster and Charap,
1993). Some of the managers in venture firms also recognized that bribery was needed to
obtain leases, lower raw material prices and lock in contracts, as well as bank credit (De
Melo et al., 1995).
Jancsics’(2013) interviews with Hungarian entrepreneurs also find that bribery is
necessary to acquire needed resources. One manager even commented that, “I would say
that small entrepreneurs are trained for it [petty corruption] because it is necessary for
survival” (Jancsics, 2013, p. 329). The importance of bribery is perhaps best illustrated in an
entrepreneur’s comment that, “I see bribe payment as business investment [. . .] like buying
input materials” (Ufere et al., 2012, p. 2445; emphasis added). These remarks suggest that
bribery helps new ventures obtain the resources necessary for their domestic operations.
As new ventures started off with a greater need for resources compared to their
established counterparts, the consequences of bribery – to obtain benefits and reduce costs –
would have a different effect. For them, the benefits from bribery may seem more important
to leverage for better survival and success. These benefits are obviously most useful for
domestic operations, and in most cases, “for new ventures [. . .] the local environment is
noted to be the primary source of resources needed for operations” (Fernhaber et al., 2008,
p. 267, emphasis added). Home country government resources procured through bribery are
therefore particularly important for new ventures. We thus argue that the effect of home
country bribery will be more pronounced for new ventures than for established firms:
H2. The negative relationship between home country bribery and firm focus on foreign
markets will be stronger for new ventures.
Moderating role of competition from informal firms
Another condition that could change the effect of home country bribery is the competition
from informal firms in firms’ home bases (Capelleras et al., 2008). Informal firms are
business entities that are not registered but still operate and compete against legally
registered firms (Bruton et al., 2012; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). In other words, these firms
do not officially exist in the government registry but operate in the marketplace. These
“underground” firms are relatively away from government officials’ discretion (Castells and
Portes, 1989).
While some competition and inter-firm rivalry is fair (Nickell, 1996), the competition from




firms have certain advantages vis-à-vis formal firms owing to the cost savings generated by
circumventing taxes, labor laws and other regulations: they can hire cheaper labor and price
goods below the accepted formal market rate (Farrell, 2004; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008).
Two-thirds of the 40,757 firms in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys from 2006 to 2011
considered informal competition as a major obstacle to their business (Friesen and Wacker,
2013).
We accordingly argue that the effect of benefits gained via bribery within the domestic
market may be dissipated by informal competition. While firms bribe home country
government officials for resources and improved positions in the domestic market, if these
resources cannot be well protected and lose their value in their home country due to informal
competition, there will no longer be a reason to focus on the domestic market, and firms may
choose to avoid the home country environment, which could be done by investing more in
foreign markets (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014). If the government fails to curb the threat of
unregistered firms, despite the fact that firms bribe officials for advantages in the home
country, there will be less incentives for these firms to stay in an environment with unfair
competition, and they would be inclined to look for opportunities abroad. We thus propose
that the effect of domestic bribery may be reduced as the competition from informal firms in
the home country increases:
H3. The negative relationship between home country bribery and firm focus on foreign
markets will be weaker for firms operating in countries with stronger competition
from informal entities.
Moderating role of new ventures and informal competition
We have argued that bribery within the home country can have differential impacts on new
ventures versus established firms, and that the level of informal competition could alter the
effect of home country bribery. These arguments consider the factors shaping the effect of
home country bribery separately; yet these two contingencies could interact in shaping a
firm’s foreign market focus. New ventures face reduced survival prospects and are
particularly vulnerable (Baik et al., 2013) and thus value government resources gained
through bribery relatively more than established firms. However, when competition from
informal firms erodes the benefits of bribery, new ventures would be even more motivated to
escape the home country environment which no longer helps them.
As new ventures are more sensitive to informal competition compared to established
firms, they may perceive that the benefits from bribery is even more diminished as informal
competition becomes intensified. Relatively young and small firms often consider informal
pressures to be major challenges (Gonzalez and Lamanna, 2007). Many entrepreneurs in
Albania, a former transition economy, responded that unfair competition from non-
registered enterprises was “the largest obstacle to their success” (Bitzenis and Nito, 2005).
Put differently, among the firms that face high informal competition in a given country,
new ventures would be particularly more susceptible to informal competition given the lack
of experience and legitimacy – i.e. liability of newness (Freeman et al., 1983). Consequently,
with greater informal competition, these new ventures will have a stronger motivation to
seek opportunities overseas for resources than established firms. More developed foreign
markets may provide a better regulated environment as well as having less informal
competition (Ghemawat, 2001). New ventures from transition economies would therefore be
motivated to seek opportunities in a more developed foreign market where they face reduced




This is in line with prior research noting that firms occupying non-dominant market
positions are apt to explore foreign markets to avoid keen competition at home, particularly
that from informal firms (Ito and Pucik, 1993; Sakaibara and Porter, 2001). We therefore
contend that under the condition of strong informal competition in the home country, new
ventures, even with more home bribery that would make domestic market attractive, will be
more likely to seek opportunities abroad:
H4. While the relationship between home country bribery and firm focus on foreign
markets is stronger for new ventures, this effect will be weaker if the new ventures
operate in countries with stronger competition from informal firms.
Methods
Data
We test our hypotheses using a panel data of firms from the BEEPS, a cross-country, large-
scale project jointly conducted by the EBRD and World Bank. Its objective is to assess a
country’s institutional environment from the perspective of businesses. Toward this goal, its
researchers designed standardized questionnaires and collected data in 2002, 2005, 2009 and
onwards. During each wave, the BEEPS covered more than 20 countries, primarily those in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
This survey is one of the most suitable databases for studying firm bribery for three
reasons. First, it includes detailed questions regarding bribery, asking managers to reflect
the amount of bribe paid to officials. Second, the survey instrument was developed and
modified multiple times before implementation, to be applied to different countries with
reasonable consistency. Finally, it uses the stratified sampling method in each country,
which ensures that the surveyed firms in different countries are properly chosen. Given
these merits, the database has been used by prior studies (Lee andWeng, 2013; Spencer and
Gomez, 2011; Yim et al., 2017).
While the BEEPS is a survey in nature, there are reasons to believe that it is not severely
affected by potential response bias and common method variance (Chang et al., 2010). First,
the main variables used in our study did not strongly rely on perceptual measures. We used
questions that specifically asked for actual behaviors. For example, our primary variables
such as firm focus on foreign markets and bribery within the home country are based on
behaviors rather than perception. These questions are less cognitively demanding and
encourage respondents to reply consistently. Second, following Svensson (2003), we test the
non-response bias by examining the observable firm attributes for companies reporting
bribery against those that did not. The t-tests on firm size and age were not significant (both
p> 0.1), suggesting that the non-response bias is not a major concern.
We gather our sample by taking three steps. First, we extract a set of firms that are
repeatedly observed in 2002, 2005 and/or 2009. Firms that are observed only once in the
observation period were excluded. Second, we focus on transition economies, which are
defined as formerly communist countries that adopted the socialist system (Hoskisson et al.,
2000). Third, we exclude observations with missing values in our theoretical variables.
Taking these steps, we have 1,298 firms and 2,684 firm-year observations for analyses. The
Appendix provides an overview of our sample.
Dependent variable
Firm foreign market focus refers to the extent that a firm emphasizes foreign versus its
domestic markets. This variable is measured using the ratio of foreign sales over total sales,




firm. The indicator has been used by prior research (Geringer et al., 2000). This variable
ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating greater emphasis on foreign versus
domestic market.
Independent and moderating variables
Home country bribery. Following Fisman and Svensson (2007), we identify a firm’s home
country bribery by using the ratio of the firm’s payment to home country government
officials scaled by its domestic sales. Information on the bribery amount is developed using
the survey question from the BEEPS questionnaire: “[o]n average, what percent of total
annual sales do firms like yours typically pay in unofficial payments/gifts to public
officials?” Because the BEEPS is intended to “gather information and opinions about the
investment climate in this country” (emphasis added), we believe that this item is mainly
about domestic bribery rather than foreign bribery.
While this question does not directly ask what the focal firm paid, asking about “firms
like yours” could be suitable for sensitive issues such as bribery. In fact, this method has
been used extensively in studies using survey data in various fields. Indirectly framed
questions were found to increase the response rate and motivate more honest responses
because the respondents are bound by the social desirability bias of over-reporting their own
good behavior and underreporting bad behavior (Fisher, 1993). The indirect questioning
method allows respondents to feel that they are not being directly scrutinized, and thereby
produces a clearer picture of what people actually did (Lusk and Norwood, 2009).
Respondents’ estimations regarding others have been found to be more exactly
correlated with their actual future behaviors versus respondents’ statements about
themselves (Epley and Dunning, 2000). It is also found that managers are most likely to
respond to the indirect questions based on their own experiences; therefore, their responses
can be interpreted as indicating the firm’s own behavior (Johnson et al., 2000). Accordingly,
the question of bribery has been commonly used to measure bribery in the literature
(Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Johnson et al., 2000, Lee andWeng, 2013).
New venture. The literature distinguishes new ventures from established firms using
firm age (Fernhaber et al., 2008; McDougall et al., 2003). Following McDougall et al. (2003),
we used a binary variable to categorize firms that are five years old or younger as new
ventures, while firms above this threshold are noted as established firms (1 = new ventures,
0 = established firms). According to the Small Business Administration (1992), the first five
years are a critical period during which survival is determined for most firms.
Competition from informal firms in the home country. Although prior research has
suggested that competitive pressure can be measured by the Herfindahl-type index, such an
indicator is unavailable as the information on unregistered firms’ sales is unobtainable. In
this study, we measured competition from informal firms in the home country using the
amount of goods or services in the market concealed from public authority scaled by that
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). The rationale behind is that a certain proportion of a
country’s production is from unregistered firms, and that the greater this proportion, the
more problematic informal competition would be. This variable is obtained from Schneider
et al. (2010). This variable is a continuous indicator with higher values indicating stronger
competitive forces from informal firms in a home country. In our data, the lowest value for
this variable is 17 (Slovakia), and the highest is 67 (Georgia).
Control variables
Our model includes several control variables that account for correlates with firm foreign




government contract. Large firms are likely to have greater foreign market focus, and
companies with stronger technological know-how and marketing resources have higher
tendencies to explore foreign markets. Firm size is measured by the number of employees
(logarithm). R&D intensity and advertising intensity are measured as the ratio of R&D
expenditures andmarketing expenditures over firm domestic sales.Government contract, on
the other hand, is a binary variable indicating whether firms have home country
governments as their clients (1 = yes and 0 = no).
Second, the decision to venture out into foreign markets can be influenced by
shareholders. In contrast with foreign invested firms that often focus more on foreign
markets (Filatotchev et al., 2008), companies owned by home country governments generally
act otherwise (Estrin et al., 2016). Given this, we include foreign ownership and government
ownership as control variables, which measure the proportion of ownership held by foreign
shareholders and home country governments.
In addition, as resources and assets are likely to be distributed unequally among firms,
firms that are efficient in managing their operations are likely to seek foreign markets. In
light of this, our model included capacity utilization as a control, measured by firms’ output
over the maximum of possible output found in the survey. In a similar vein, we control for
new product development, a dichotomous variable indicating whether firms had developed a
new product within the past three years (Golovko and Valentini, 2014).
Third, as home country contexts have a profound impact on firm bribery (Martin et al.,
2007), firms’ motivation to explore foreign markets can be affected by the development of
their home countries. In light of this, our models include GDP (logarithm) and EU, a binary
variable that was coded as 1 if a nation had a European Union membership at the time of the
survey year, and 0 otherwise. Finally, our models include a battery of year and industry
dummies. We create two dummies to denote years 2005 and 2009 to capture any periodic
effect in comparison to year 2002, which is the base year. Industry information, on the other
hand, was based on a question asking respondents to indicate from which sector firms
generated the most revenues: textiles, garments, chemicals, plastics and rubber, basic
metals, etc. The baseline category is “other manufacturing.”
Analytic approaches
We have three issues to consider for the analytic approaches. First, as our data have firms
appearing multiple times and thus has panel data structure, it is crucial to determine
whether random or fixed effects models should be used. The Hausman test is useful in
examining the correlation between unobserved individual effects and observed predictors
(Greene, 2008, pp. 200-210). As the Hausman (1978) test is significant (x 2 = 154.67, p <
0.001), the null hypothesis that individual effects are uncorrelated with the regressors is
rejected, suggesting that the fixed effect model would be more suitable. The use of firm-fixed
effects means that the reported models explain within-firm variation in the market focus
rather than inter-firm variation in the market focus. We used Stata’s “xtreg, fe” command for
the estimation.
Second, the measure of home country bribery deserves our attention. An assumption of
the OLS model is that independent variables are exogenous. As bribery is likely an
endogenous variable (Martin et al., 2007; Svensson, 2003), models without considering the
endogeneity problem may generate biased estimates. One way to alleviate the endogeneity
issue is to use the instrument variable (IV) approach (Greene, 2008). A good instrument is
expected to be strongly correlated with the independent variable but weakly correlated with
the dependent variable. In the present study, we instrumented a focal firm’s bribery using




Firms’ locations were identified using an item in BEEPS which categorized all firms’
locations into 134 unique areas in 26 countries.
This instrument was considered as other firms’ bribery activities may be correlated with
a focal firm’s bribery but not necessarily affect the focal firm’s focus on foreign markets. We
obtained this instrument by first identifying a firm’s location using an item in BEEPS. We
then calculated the average bribery level for other firms within the same industry while
excluding a focal firm’s own bribery level. The average bribery level of other firms is
strongly correlated with a focal firm’s own bribery (r = 0.17, p< 0.001) but weakly correlated
with foreign market focus (r =0.06, p< 0.05), suggesting that the instrument is suitable. In
our models, all the independent and control variables are lagged. As our data set included
multiple observations for the same firm, we used the Huber–White sandwich estimator that
generates robust variance estimates and robust standard errors.
Results
Main findings
Table I summarizes the descriptive statistics and correlations of our variables. As shown,
our sample firms have a relatively low focus on foreign markets (Mean = 10.63) and show a
reasonable variation (S.D. = 25). On average, these firms paid 0.83 per cent of their sales to
home country government officials. Multi-collinearity is not a major concern as the highest
VIF value is 3.23, which is below the recommended threshold of 5.3 (Hair et al., 1998).
Table II summarizes the results of regression models. Model 1 includes the control
variables, Model 2 tests the effect of home country bribery and Model 3 adds the interaction
of bribery in the home country and new venture. Models 4 tests the moderating effect of
informal competition, and Model 5 includes the three-way interaction term. All models are
significant (p < 0.001), suggesting that the independent variables have high explanatory
power.
H1 argues that firms that pay bribes in their home countries will focus less on foreign
markets. In Model 2, the coefficient of bribery in the home country is negative (b = 1.65,
p < 0.05). It means that holding all other factors as equal, a standard deviation increase of
home country bribery will reduce firm focus on foreign markets by 4.43 per cent. As the
average firm’s foreign market focus in our data is not high, the effect is economically
relevant. This finding provides strong support toH1.
H2 contends that the effect of home country bribery will be stronger for new ventures
than for established firms. According to Model 3, the interaction between bribery and new
ventures is negative and significant (b = 5.42, p < 0.001). The economic significance of
this variable can be examined by adjusting the values of home country bribery and new
ventures. A standard deviation increase of home country bribery from the mean would
lower an established firm’s focus on foreign markets by 4.11 per cent. In contrast, for new
ventures, a standard deviation increase in home country bribery will reduce foreign market
focus by 18.50 per cent. As the change of the foreign market focus is fairly large (14.39 per
cent),H2 is supported.
H3 argues that the negative effect of home country bribery will be reduced when firms
face greater competition from the informal sector within their home countries. A positive
interaction between home country bribery and competition from informal firms would
support this hypothesis. In Model 4, we find a positive interaction between bribery within
the home country and competition from informal firms (b = 0.15, p < 0.01). The effect of
this estimate is also economically relevant. If we set informal competition at the mean level,
then a standard deviation in home country bribery will decrease firm focus on foreign










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































deviation above the mean, the same amount of bribery would lower firm focus on foreign
markets only by 4.88 per cent. As the change of foreign market focus is non-trivial (4.7 per
cent) in our context, the finding provides support forH3.
H4 proposes that the interaction effect between bribery and new ventures will be reduced
in countries where informal competition is intense. This hypothesis predicts a positive three-
way interaction of between country bribery, new ventures and informal competition that
affects firm focus on foreign markets. The result is shown in Model 5. While the sign of the
interaction variable is positive as expected, it is non-significant (p < 0.1), thus H4 is not
supported.
To gain additional insight, we graphed the interaction effects in Figure 1. In creating
Figure 1, we set the low (high) value as one standard deviation below (above) the mean and
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consistent with our hypotheses. Plot (a) shows that although bribery in the home country
generally reduces firms’ focus on foreign markets, the impact of bribery is greater for new
ventures than for established firms, which supports H2. Similarly, plot (b) indicates that
while the relationship between home country bribery and foreign market focus are both
negative for firms facing lower and higher informal competition, the slope of the firms
operating in countries with higher informal competition is flatter than the slope than those
firms operating in countries with lower informal competition. Such a finding is consistent
with the idea ofH3.
Robustness checks
Aside from the main findings, we also perform several additional analyses to ensure that our
results are robust. First, as our dependent variable has both a lower and upper limit bound
(0 and 100 per cent, respectively) we use a two-sided Tobit regression as estimation
technique (Greene, 2000). We run Tobit models with clustered errors by industry using the
command xttobit varlist, ll(0) ul(100). According to Table III, our results also hold in the
Tobit models.
We also consider the multi-level structure of the variables (firm-, industry- and
country-level), and use multilevel modeling techniques to analyze our data with Stata’s
xtmixed command. Our use of these mixed models allows for clustering of observations
in groups, which constitute a hierarchical level above each data level, such as industry
and country levels (Schielzeth and Nakagawa, 2013). We find that the results of these
models are also consistent, with the exception of the non-significance for the interaction
term between bribery and competition from informal firms, which is one of the
limitations.
Second, we consider several additional country-level variables that may be relevant
given our research topic including government corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2009), rule of
law (Kaufmann et al., 2009), political constraint (Henisz, 2000) and incidence of national
leader change. Government corruption was measured by control of corruption index; the
original values range from 2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating high control of
corruption. To facilitate interpretation, we reverse-code it such that higher values indicate
that the government corruption issue is more prevalent. The variable of rule of law is from
Kaufmann et al. (2009), and the information of political constraint index is from Henisz
(2000). We create a dummy variable National leader change to indicate whether a nation’s
leader changed in each year. We add these variables separately into our models and perform
estimations. The results with these additional controls are consistent with our main findings
andmay be provided upon request.
Third, although our measure of bribery provides useful information regarding a firm’s
home country bribery, a potential limitation is that it may include both passive bribery (e.g.
bribes extorted by home country government officials) and active bribery (e.g. bribes used
proactively to seek preferential treatments). We therefore endeavor to differentiate active
bribery from the passive one. To do so, we first regress the observed bribery amount on
government corruption, GDP, firm size, research and development (R&D) intensity,
advertising intensity, government contract, new ventures, informal competition and other
control variables. Using the estimate results, we calculate the predicted home country
bribery.
Accordingly, an alternative home country bribery measure can be developed by
subtracting the predicted bribery amount from the observed bribery amount. For
instance, if one firm X had the predicted home country bribery of 2.2 per cent and its
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as 0.8 per cent (3-2.2 = 0.8). Alternatively, if another firm Y had the predicted home
country bribery of 1.4 per cent, while the reported bribery amount is 0.9 per cent, the
home country bribery of this firm would be documented as 0.5 per cent (1.4-0.9 =
0.5). As can be reasoned, negative values suggest firms paid less bribes than the
predicted levels; these are passive bribers. Alternatively, positive values indicate that
firms paid bribes more than the predicted amounts and thus are active bribers. Using
this alternative bribery variable, we performed additional analyses. The estimations
based on this alternative measure of briery are consistent with our main results.
Fourth, we considered an alternative measure of informal competition in the home
country. Although measuring the strength of informal competition is “inherently
difficult” (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008, p. 280), we strove to capture the level of
competition from informal firms in a particular industry by following two steps. First,
we sorted out an item in BEEPS that asked managers to indicate the challenges posed
by informal firms: “To what extent the practices of competitors in the informal sectors
create obstacle to this establishment?” This item used a 0-4 scale, with 0 being “no
obstacle,” while “four being very severe obstacle.” Second, we averaged the values by
firms within an industry in a home country to measure the competition from informal
firms for each industry. To ease interpretation, we re-scaled this variable to 1-5, with
higher values indicating more obstacles created by informal firms in an industry.
Results with these industry averaged values for informal competition were very
consistent with our main findings[1].
Discussion
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of home country bribery on firms’ foreign
market focus. Researchers have begun to investigate the determinants of firm bribery, a
growing topic in the management literature (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Luo, 2005; Spencer and
Gomez, 2011). Despite the rich and useful findings, a less explored question is: what are the
strategic implications of bribery? In addition, while many studies focus on firms’ bribery
activities in host countries (i.e. Di Guardo et al., 2016; Keillor et al., 2005), we look at firms’
bribery in their home country and how this affects their foreign market strategies. In doing
so, we wish to advance the literature on home country institutions and the research on firm
global strategies (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Ngo et al., 2016; Tan and Chintakananda, 2016).
In this study, we use the literature on corruption (Martin et al., 2007) to study the
consequences of firm bribery. We contend that the more firms bribe to gain resources, the
more likely that their domestic markets would appear attractive, and the less motivation
they will have in exploring foreign markets. Building on this baseline argument, we also
examine the conditions that may alter the effect of home country bribery, depending on
whether firms are new ventures or established firms and the level of informal competition in
the home country. We tested these arguments using a panel data of firms in transition
economies, and the results provide broad support to our arguments.
Theoretical implications
This study contributes to the IB literature in two major ways. First, our study adds to the
literature on government corruption (Doh et al., 2003; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, and Eden,
2005) by investigating the implications of home country bribery. We contend that bribery
has strategic implications for firms via the benefits and resources it provides. These benefits
would induce bribing firms to focus more on the domestic market where obtained
government resources and preferential treatments can be harnessed, therefore decreasing




The second contribution is that our study examines the contingencies that shape the
effect of home country bribery. While both established firms and new ventures have
incentives to approach officials to achieve their strategic goals, the impact of home country
bribery is not the same for them. New ventures generally need more government resources
than their established counterparts; thus, the effect of home country bribery which creates a
more favorable home country environment is more pronounced for new ventures. Due to
these benefits, new ventures’ tendencies to focus on foreign markets diminish considerably
more as they pay bribes to home country government officials.
The other contingent factor is the competition from informal firms in the home country
(Bruton et al., 2012; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). These unregistered businesses can move
quickly without being regulated and pose challenges to the domestic operations of
registered firms. With much informal competition, the benefits of bribery are reduced. In
such a case where the home country environment becomes burdensome without much
benefits, firms may seek to avoid home countries by exploring foreign markets (Cuervo-
Cazurra et al., 2014). This reasoning suggests that while bribery can enhance a firm’s focus
on its domestic market, the effect decreases when firms are challenged by intense
competition from the informal entities in the home country. By considering these
contingencies both theoretically and empirically, our study wishes to provide a more
nuanced picture regarding how firms’ bribery in their home country affects foreign market
focus.
Practical implications
Our findings have several implications for practitioners. First, managers should be aware
that bribery has consequences for their global strategies. Given that the benefits from
government resources are country-specific, many bribing firms may find their domestic
markets more attractive and thus overlook opportunities in foreign markets. Consequently,
practitioners should consider their home country activities (especially bribery) in their
evaluation of foreign market opportunities. Firms that use money to influence home country
government officials are advised to have a more holistic view in evaluating foreign market
opportunities. Despite the potential challenges, new markets in other nations may have the
unique resources and endowments that home countries do not readily offer (Ghemawat,
2001). Missing these opportunities may not be in the best interest of firms.
Second, managers in new ventures should be particularly mindful of the implications of
bribery. We find that relative to established firms, new ventures generally have greater
dependences on the government, and that such reliance will intensify the effect of home
country bribery. Due to their newness and resource constraints, ventures are more
challenged to compete for public resources against established counterparts. Using money
to influence government officials thus is one method to support new ventures’ domestic
operations. Aside from this method, entrepreneurial firms could also consider strategically
allocating their resources and efforts on nascent industries or to operate in sectors with
fewer dominant players, or where governments provide more generous support. By
choosing their domains strategically, new ventures will have more chances to secure public
resources and improve their survival prospects in the home countries.
Limitations and future directions
Our paper has several limitations that provide opportunities for future research. First, to
gain additional insights, we encourage researchers to adopt other methods such as
qualitative interviews or more sophisticated questionnaires to capture this effect. Second, in




connections with home country governments (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) which would have
a positive impact on firm performance. As extensions, researchers can develop frameworks
to study these alternative methods.
Third, our research setting is transition economies. Aside from countries included in this
study, future studies can examine other emerging economies (such as India or China).
Despite the market potential and resources, the institutions in these countries are not fully
developed yet and government corruption issues may exist. Scholars therefore can design
research to examine how the domestic activities may influence firm global strategies.
Fourth, while BEEPS provides rich and detailed information regarding firms’ bribery
activities in the home country, information regarding the host countries which these firms
explore is largely unavailable. It would be interesting to know whether the effect of home
country bribery influence critical decisions in global strategies such as location choices and
entry modes.
Conclusion
This study examines how home country bribery may influence firms’ foreign market focus.
We contend that domestic bribery allows firms to receive favorable treatments, which
makes their domestic environments more attractive. Consequently, home country bribery
can facilitate domestic operations and in turn influence firms’market focus. Building on this
premise, we also argue that the effect of home country bribery may be altered depending on
two crucial conditions, including whether firms are new ventures or established companies
and the competition from informal firms in the home country. Amassing a panel data of
firms in multiple transition economies, we find that new ventures have higher tendencies to
focus on their domestic markets when they gain benefits from bribery. Moreover,
competition from informal firms in the home country prompts firms to seek opportunities
abroad despite the resources and favorable treatments acquired from bribery. These
findings collectively suggest that firms’ decisions to explore foreign markets are closely
related to their home country activities and domestic contexts. In closing, we hope these
arguments and findings can simulate more research examining the relationship between
home country and firm internationalization.
Note
1. In the interest of space, only part of the robustness checks is shown here, but the full results are
available upon request.
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Country No. of firms No. of observations
Average amount of bribery
(percentage in firm sales)
Albania 19 38 1.46
Armenia 95 201 1.33
Azerbaijan 6 12 4.60
Belarus 25 54 1.72
Bosnia 25 50 0.72
Bulgaria 92 189 2.04
Croatia 58 119 1.44
Czech Republic 21 44 2.39
Estonia 71 151 1.50
FYROM 50 101 1.06
Georgia 87 187 1.40
Hungary 44 89 2.10
Kazakhstan 61 125 1.57
Kyrgyz 53 110 2.69
Latvia 69 142 1.74
Lithuania 52 107 1.64
Moldova 72 147 1.28
Poland 81 166 1.89
Romania 68 136 1.86
Russia 32 66 1.49
Slovakia 27 55 1.95
Slovenia 69 151 1.65
Tajikistan 52 104 1.00
Ukraine 69 140 2.08
Total 1,298 2,684
Home country
bribery
249
